The author, a philosopher, suggests that the concept of death should be left as it is 'in its present indeterminatestate', and that we ought to reject attempts to define death in terns ofwhole-brain death or any other type ofbrain death, including cerebral death and 'irreversible coma'. Instead of 'fiddling with the definition ofdeath' clear rules should be established specifying 'what can be appropriately done to whom when'.
A commentary by a neurological expert on brain death follows this paper.
An enormous amount of energy has been spent on the question of when a person is dead. Ofall the proposals that have emerged, the so-called 'whole-brain' definition has been by far the most popular: a person is dead if and only if all that person's brain functions have irreversibly ceased functioning. This definition differs from the definition, long accepted by the courts, of Black's Law Dictionary that death is 'the cessation of life; the ceasing to exist; defined by physicians as a total stoppage ofthe circulation ofthe blood, and a cessation of the animal and vital functions consequent thereon, such as respiration, pulsation, etc.' (i) -in that it takes only spontaneous heartbeat and respiration to be indicative of life. When those functions occur, but are artificially sustained, the whole-brain definition forces us to say that what we have is a corpse being ventilated, not life being maintained. And the definition differs from the so-called 'cerebral-death' definition of death in that whereas, according to the latter, a person is dead as soon as he is irreversibly comatose -a state which occurs as soon as the neocortex is permanently nonfunctioning -whole-brain death requires, in addition, that spontaneous heartbeat and respiration have also permanently ceased -a state which does not occur until the activity of the brain stem, as well as that of the neocortex, has permanently shut down (2 and a more radical view to be discussed below. And neither of these positions supports a whole-brain definition of death. I will now try to make out these claims.
Ifone has what I take to be the natural reaction to the definition then one will say that the whole-brain definition of death must be accompanied by a denial that certain traditional death-behaviour (burial, experimentation, etc) becomes permissible if and only if a person is dead. But ifone does say this, and claims that we can in some circumstances withdraw all lifesupport systems before a person is dead, but cannot use a body as a reservoir of transplantable organs or for information-seeking or teaching purposes until after a person is dead, then the only significant effect ofupdating death to whole-brain death is that it allows one to offer the 'death-justification' for terminating treatment earlier than we currently can. This does not mean that we can terminate treatment any earlier, for whether or not we update death, we already can and should agree that all health-care services can be routinely terminated (at least) by the time whole-brain death has occurred. It only means that we can offer a different justificationthe death-justification -for doing so. And the possibility of being able to give that justification at that time comes at the cost of having to deny that certain behaviour, traditionally thought to become appropriate at the time of death, does become appropriate at that time. The question now arises as to whether there is sufficient utility in this to warrant updating death. I do not think there is.
There are two advantages that can be alleged for updating the death-justification. First, one may claim that it allows us.to withdraw all health-care services from patients without, at the same time, having to deny the view that doctors ought to do all they can for their patients until they are dead. Second, one may claim that it is easier on grieving relatives and friends to hear that treatment was discontinued because their loved one was dead, rather than because he was in a state deemed not worth preserving.
Both of these purported advantages, however, are highly contentious and require considerabli defence.
It does not take much to show that this is so in the case of the first. A common reason for wanting to preserve that dogma is to resist euthanasia. But insofar as we update death, we let through the back door what we exclude from the front, and why that should be thought an advantage needs to be explained. The most plausible rationale consists in appealing to the second 'advantage' above, which will be discussed in a moment. But there is something else which needs explaining as well: why euthanasia should be resisted at all. If one only wants to resist non-voluntary euthanasia, then, insofar as the definition ofdeath falls short of cerebral death, one needs to explain why exactly it would be wrong to terminate the lives ofthose who, like Karen Ann Quinlan, are irreversibly comatose; and also why it would be wrong to bring about the death of those who are incapable of requesting it, but are in such a bad way that they can only look forward to a life of pain interrupted by one medical crisis after another. And if one, in addition, wants to oppose voluntary euthanasia, one needs to explain why an individual in extreme and permanently unrelievable pain should not be entitled to receive death on request (5).
Not only is it questionable whether there is any advantage in preserving the doctrine that doctors ought to give their patients optimal care until the end; that doctrine cannot, in any case, be maintained by any proponent of a whole-brain definition of death who makes the above judgments about when certain behaviour is appropriate. For on the above account, it is appropriate to withdraw all health-care services at the time of cerebral death; so the most that could be claimed in this regard is that updating the deathjustification reduces the number of cases in which that doctrine is infringed.
The utility of updating the death-justification in the way in question may be thought to lie in the second alleged advantage (that it makes things easier for grieving relatives and friends). But that too rests on a dubious doctrine. Judgments of death seem to be cold, hard, scientific facts. That, no doubt, is why they are easier to accept than their alternative, the making of fallible value-judgments about the worth oflives. But it is not a biological fact that one who has suffered whole-brain death is dead. One can say that it is a biological fact that ifsuch a person is not on a respirator -if blood is not circulating, food metabolising, wastes being eliminated, etc -than that person is dead. But if he is on a respirator, and these processes are occurring -albeit artificially supported -then, while one may want to say the person is dead, one cannot claim this to be a biological fact. Biology, and science in general, are quiet on the question of whether vital functions must occur naturally if an organism is to be counted as alive. The only plausible rationale for such a judgment, it seems to me, is that since it is inappropriate to exhibit towards this person any of the behaviour traditionally associated with living human beings, and is appropriate to exhibit towards him or her behaviour associated with dead human beings, we can fittingly classify the person as dead. But if this is the basis, then the judgment that a person who has suffered wholebrain death is dead encapsulates certain valuejudgments. The 'advantage' in question can now be seen to come from passing off a value-laden judgment as a value-free one. To defend that, we need to defend a version ofmedical paternalism; specifically, we need to defend the view that misrepresentation is sometimes justified on the ground that it reduces suffering. I have yet to see any clear-cut defence of this position, and suspect that none can be provided (6) . That defence, however, is something which must be produced before the whole-brain definition can be accepted by anyone who makes certain judgments about when traditional death-behaviour becomes appropriate. For until it is, we are still in need of a demonstration that there is any legitimate gain to be made by adopting that definition.
Of course, one may not accept the common judgments on which the above critique is based. One may claim that it is only misplaced aesthetic sensibilities that cause one to say that we must wait for heart-lung death before we can begin transplant proceedings, use a body for certain information-seeking purposes, and so forth. After all, so the argument might run, there is no more reason to wait until all artificially supported respiration and cardiac activity have stopped than there is to wait until all cellular activity has stopped. There is a good deal to be said for this view, and I incline towards it myself. But one of the things that cannot be said is that it gives any support to a whole-brain defmiition of death. If one is prepared to say that we can initiate the above sorts of behaviour on a person who is irreversibly comatose but has artificially supported respiration and heartbeat, it is going to be difficult to explain why such behaviour would be inappropriate in cases in which the person is irreversibly comatose and displays spontaneous respiration and heartbeat. It is
hard to see what of moral relevance can be said for supporting action in the former case that will not also support it in the latter. And if we can get over our squeamishness in the case ofthe one, we should be able
there is a relevant difference between spontaneous and artificially supported respiration and heartbeat, then any behaviour deemed appropriate at the time of whole-brain death will also be appropriate at the time of cerebral death. Thus we are, once again, left with the conclusion that no significant deathbehaviour is uniquely correlated with the time of whole-brain death; and with that, the disutility of having to accompany the whole-brain definition with the denial that certain traditional implications for behaviour hold. And since there is nothing new that can be provided by way of compensating advantages, our judgment on that definition must be as before.
For the above reasons, I want to reject a whole-brain definition of death. But I do not want to do that because I think there is some other way ofprecising the definition that ought to be adopted; rather, my view is that death should not be redefined at all. To give some substance to this view, I will end with some remarks on the problem of defining death.
When we say that a person is dead, this implies two things: i) that it is now appropriate to initiate certain behaviour, and 2) that the person is now in a certain physiological state. It is not easy to say exactly what behaviour is wedded to judgments ofdeath, nor exactly what the physiological state referred to is. But serious distortion would be done to the concept of death if it were defined so that no traditional death-behaviour became appropriate when it occurred, or if it were made to refer only to certain physiological states, for example, to those in which cellular death had occurred, or to those in which the organism still displayed spontaneous heartbeart and respiration. The problem of redefining death is that of trying to find a precise point that will enable us to keep these implications without at the same time incurring overwhelming disutilities. I want to suggest that this cannot be done.
If we define death to coincide with the time of cerebral death we have a point which, depending on certain evaluations we make, coincides with some or all traditional death-behaviour. But even if it turned out that all death-behaviour coalesces at the time of cerebral death, it does not follow that we ought to adopt a cerebral death definition of death. For such a defmition has the disadvantage of being off the scale of physiological states encompassed by the ordinary concept of death, and thus we would be faced with a conceptual crisis: the half of the concept ofdeath relating to appropriate behaviour would incline us to that definition, whereas the half which refers to the state of the organism would incline us against it. On the principle that the burden of justification lies on the proponents of change, it is up to one who wishes to advocate the cerebral death definition in this situation to show the benefit ofadopting it. No support, however, can be drawn from ordinary language, for it is not a part ofthe 
